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Commercial Policy Reform in Pakistan:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
Abstract
This is a theoretical and empirical study of commercial policy reform in a small open
economy. The first part develops a theoretical model and obtains welfare effects of revenue-
neutral tax reforms and expressions for optimal taxes — trade taxes on final goods and
intermediate inputs, and consumption taxes — when tax revenue is used to provide a public
good. The second part estimates, for Pakistan, the optimal taxes using the formulae de-
veloped in the theoretical part and examine if revenue-neutral tax reforms can be welfare
improving. These estimates suggest that there is considerable scope for further reducing
tariffs on final goods, but not that on intermediate inputs.
JEL Classifications: F1, O2, O5.
Keywords: VAT, tariffs, government revenue, Pakistan.
1 Introduction
Pakistan, like most other developing countries, followed an import substitution strategy for
industrialization, which relied on high tariffs, import quotas and exchange rate overvaluation.
Quantitative restrictions on trade were relaxed during the mid-eighties. Progress in tariff
reduction started only in the late eighties. Although maximum tariff rates have been brought
down to 25% in 2003,1 it is by no means clear that further reductions should not be made.
The hesitation in reducing tariff rates is primarily due to two reasons. First, the
concern is about the effect it will have on special interest groups. These interest groups
benefit from a wide range of discretionary concessions: some groups are allowed imports at
zero duty and others at reduced rates.2 The level of concessions provided are considerable.
In 1997-98, revenue foregone due to these concessions (at Karachi customs) amounted to
Rs. 23.5 billion (41% of potential tariff revenues at Karachi customs). Concessions are
obtained through lobbying efforts by well organized groups, typically representing only a
limited number of large organizations. Unlike these groups, those who would benefit from
overall reduction in tariff rates are typically less organized and consist of a large number of
small firms. Thus by default, policy is strongly influenced by the groups currently enjoying
concessions.
The second reason for the hesitation is due to the effect it may have on revenues.
In 1997-98, Custom House Karachi reported collection of import duties of Rs. 18 billion on
items on which the statutory duty was 35% to 45% (representing 55% of their total collection
of import duties). If the duty on these items was reduced to 25%, estimated revenue loss in
1997-98 would have amounted to Rs. 7 billion for Karachi customs. This represented 21% of
their total import tariff revenues of Rs. 34 billion for that year. The revenue loss projected
for the whole country would be Rs. 15.5 billion or 4.6% of total federal tax revenues of
Rs. 338 billion collected in 1997-98.
Another interesting aspect of trade in developing countries is that imports of inter-
mediate inputs form a significant part of total imports. In Pakistan, for example, imports
of intermediate inputs formed 54% of total imports in 1999-2000. High import duties on
such products can have serious adverse implications for the manufacturing sectors which the
import substitution policies are supposed to protect.
In light of government dependence on tariff revenues, the success of tariff reform is
contingent upon development of alternative revenue sources and the institutional mechanisms
for effective tax administration. During the nineties, countries continued to experiment with
commercial policies in order to balance trade liberalization and fiscal reform. In particular,
many countries have been depending more and more on consumption taxes rather than
tariffs as a source for government revenue. Since consumption taxes do not discriminate
1This excludes automobiles on which the duty rates ranged between 75% and 200% in 2002-2003.
2As an example, on the imports of Rs. 39.3 billion (at Karachi customs) which were subject to a statutory
rate of 45% in 1997-98, tariff revenues should have amounted to Rs. 17.7 billion. However, due to concessions
actual collection amounted to only Rs. 12.1 billion implying an average duty rate of 30.8% instead of the
statutory rate of 45%.
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between domestic and foreign sources, these are acceptable to the multilateral institutions
like the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, consumption taxes are more difficult
to administer and are politically very sensitive.
The 1993-94 reform envisaged increase in sales tax to compensate for revenue losses
due to scaling down of tariff rates. Considerable progress has been made in this regard. The
share of sales tax in total tax revenues increased from 13% in 1990-91 to 35% in 2001-2002,
while the share of taxes on international trade decreased from 39% to 10% during the same
period.3 The chances of success in raising sales tax (which takes the form of a value added
tax) is closely tied to the administrative ability for tax collection.
The purpose of this paper is to carry out a theoretical and empirical study of commer-
cial policy reform in a small open economy with intermediate inputs. The first part develops
a theoretical model, based on the stylised facts as outlined above, using duality approach.
It then considers welfare effects of piece-meal revenue-neutral policy reforms, and obtains
expressions for optimal taxes — discriminatory trade taxes on final goods and intermediate
inputs, and non-discriminatory consumption taxes — when tax revenue is used to provide
a public good.4 In the piece-meal reform exercise, we consider two scenarios. In the first,
tariffs on final goods are unalterable and the reform involves changing tariffs on intermediate
inputs and consumption tax so as to leave tax revenue unchanged at the initial equilibrium.
In the second, tariffs on intermediate inputs are unalterable and the reform involves chang-
ing consumption tax and tariffs on final goods. These two scenarios correspond to different
assumptions on the relative strengths of the various lobby groups. For example workers and
management of Pakistan Steel Mills have a strong interest in maintaining high tariffs on the
imports of steel that conflicts with the interest of businesses which are users of steel as input
in production.5 In contrast, business groups lobby for tariffs on the products they produce.
If the former lobby is dominant then it is reasonable to treat tariffs on steel as unalterable. If
business groups become more influential then tariff on importable consumables can be taken
as unalterable and tariff on steel as alterable.6
In the second part, we estimate, for Pakistan, the optimal taxes using the formulae
developed in the theoretical part. We also examine the effects of revenue neutral commercial
policy reforms on welfare. It may be instructive to compare our paper with another recent
theoretical contribution in the area of tariff and tax reform. In their paper Keen and Ligthart
(2002) propose tariff and tax reform strategies which involve reduction in tariffs accompanied
3In 2000-2001, other taxes included excise (10%), surcharges (11%) and direct taxes (30.5%).
4For second best analysis in the presence of preexisting price distortions see Lloyd (1974), Lahiri and
Raimondos (1996), Lahiri et al (2000), and Krishna and Panagariya (1997). For an analysis of tariff reforms
in the presence of intermediate inputs see, for example, Lo´pez and Rodrik (1990) and Lo´pez and Panagariya
(1992). Finally, the question of reforms of consumption taxes and tariffs has been analysed in Michael et al
(1993).
5In fact, in the past high tariffs were maintained on the imports of steel precisely for this and other
reasons. In recent years, tariffs on steel have come down significantly resulting in significant redundancies
in the steel industry.
6In fact, the strong lobby of the automobile producers has not allowed any serious reduction in tariffs de-
spite the significant reform in tariffs. The tariffs range between 75 percent and 200 percent in the automobile
sector in 2002-2003.
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by increases in consumption taxes that leave consumer prices unchanged. They derive con-
ditions under which the coordinated tax-tariff reform increases welfare and public finances.
Our paper bears similarities with some of the extensions considered by Keen and Ligthart on
their basic model. First, we also allow for the pre-existence of consumption tax and tariffs on
final goods and tariffs on intermediate goods. Second, we also allow for government revenue
constraint in our model, and as in their paper allow for the possibility that the government
ability to raise revenue through lump-sum taxes may be limited and that it may resort to
distortionary taxes. Finally fiscal revenues and welfare considerations figure prominently in
both models. Our analysis however differs in a number of important respects from that of
Keen and Ligthart. First, in our model the entire government revenue is used to finance
a public good. The public good aspect does not figure in Keen and Litgthart. Secondly,
our paper considers two types of tax reforms. The first set of reforms are of the piecemeal
type and this is where our theoretical analysis can be seen as extensions of those of Keen
and Ligthart.7 Here it is assumed that the tax reforms leave government revenue unchanged
(revenue neutral reforms).8 The second set of reforms — which Keen and Ligthart do not
address — are those for which optimal tax rates are computed when government’s ability to
raise taxes by lump-sum means are limited so that at the margin distortionary taxes have
to be imposed. Setting optimal taxes involves compensating the loss from the higher prices
on private goods implied by taxes and tariffs with the benefit from access to greater level of
public goods.
2 The theoretical framework
We consider a general equilibrium model of a small open economy. There are three goods
produced in the economy. The first good is the numeraire good, which the country under
consideration exports and whose price is set to unity (p1 = 1). Good 2 is an importable final
good whose international price is p2 and which is subject to ad-valorem imports tariffs τ2.
We also assume that there is an ad-valorem value added tax, denoted by t, which is applied
uniformly to the consumption of good 2.9
Thus the domestic consumer and producer price of good 2 is p2(1 + τ2)(1 + t) and
p2(1 + τ2) respectively. Furthermore, we assume that the government is unable to collect
all of consumption tax revenue and we denote by γ the fraction of consumption tax revenue
that is not collected.10 However, this does not affect the consumer price as benefit accrues
to the seller and is not passed on to the consumers in terms of lower price.
7It is also to be noted that unlike us Keen and Litgthart do not verify, using data from a country, if the
derived theoretical conditions for the reform strategy to be beneficial hold in the context of that country.
8The present analysis can also be seen as a direct extension of Lahiri et al (2000) in that Lahiri et al
(2000) considered a very specific second-best analysis, viz. optimal second-best tariffs on steel for unalterable
levels of consumption tax rate and tariffs on manufacturing goods.
9By assuming uniformity of consumption tax, we are ruling out the equity motive of setting consumption
taxes. This has been examined in details in a number of studies including Ahmed and Stern (1991) and
Coady (1997). In the sectors, where it is applicable, consumption tax is applied uniformly in Pakistan. It is
not used as an instrument of equity.
10In our estimates, we used revenue shortfall figure in the range of zero and 20 percent.
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Good 3 is a purely intermediate input, the international price of which is denoted by
p3, and the imports of which are subject to tariffs at the rate τ3.
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The expenditure and the revenue function are given by E(1, p2(1+τ2)(1+ t), g, u) and
R(1, p2(1 + τ2), p3(1 + τ3)) respectively, where u is the level of utility for the representative
consumer and g is the level of public good provision. Note that the arguments of the
expenditure function are the consumer prices and that of the revenue function are producer
prices, and that price of good 3 does not appear in the expenditure functions as it is purely
an intermediate good.12 It is well known that the partial derivative of the revenue function
with respect to the ith price gives the supply function for the ith good. Similarly, the partial
derivative of the expenditure function with respect to the ith price gives the compensated
demand function for the ith good. It is also well know that the supply functions thus obtained
can be interpreted as net of intermediate input use (see Dixit and Norman (1980, p.31) and
Lo´pez and Panagariya (1992, p.617)). Therefore, −R3 is the net imports of the intermediate
input (good 3).13 −E3 (= −∂E/∂g) > 0 represents the marginal willingness to pay (MWP)
for the public good.14
The budget constraint of the representative consumer is given by
E(1, p2(1 + τ2)(1 + t), g, u) = R(1, p2(1 + τ2), p3(1 + τ3)) + γt(1 + τ2)p2E2, (1)
where γt(1 + τ2)p2E2 is the proportion of consumption tax revenue that accrues to the
representative consumer as income, and therefore tax revenue, T , is given by
T = τ2p2(E2 −R2) + (1− γ)t(1 + τ2)p2E2 + τ3p3(−R3). (2)
The first three terms on the right hand side of (2) are respectively tariff revenue from
good 2, consumption tax revenue from the sale of good 2, and tariff revenue from the imports
of good 3.
Finally, it is assumed that the government balances its budget. In other words, the
entire tax revenue, T , is used to finance the provision of public good. For simplicity, it is
taken that one unit of the numeraire good is used up to produce one unit of the public good.
This simplification together with the balanced budget assumption implies that:
g = T (3)
This completes the description of the model. Since the economy under consideration
is a small open one, all the prices are exogenous, and we have three equations in three
endogenous variables in u, g and T .
11In order to promote exports, many countries including Pakistan give refund for tariffs on intermediate
inputs for exporters. For Pakistan, this refund amounts to a very small proportion of total indirect tax
revenue.
12Since the level of endowments do not vary in our analysis, for brevity, these are left out of the arguments
of the revenue function. See Dixit and Norman (1980) for properties of the expenditure and the revenue
functions.
13Ri and Ei are respectively the partial derivatives of the revenue and the expenditure functions with
respect to their ith arguments.
14See, for example, Abe (1992) for details.
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3 The Theoretical Analysis
Having described the model, we now turn to the analysis. For simplicity we shall henceforth
assume that E23 ' 0. This assumption implies that the public good and the non-numeraire
private good are taken to be independent in consumption, and all the adjustments of a
change in the public good provision (at a given utility level) fall on the numeraire good.15
Totally differentiating (1)-(3) we obtain16
[E4 − {δτ2 + (γ + δ(1− γ))t(1 + τ2)}p2E24] du
= [{−(1 + t) + δ + (γ + δ(1− γ))t}p2E2 − (δ − 1)p2R2 +
(1 + t)p22{δτ2 + t(1 + τ2)(γ + δ(1− γ))}E22 − δτ2p22R22 − δτ3p2p3R32]dτ2 (4)
+[(δ − 1)(1− γ)(1 + τ2)p2E2 + (1 + τ2)p22{δτ2 + t(1 + τ2)(γ + δ(1− γ))}E22]dt
−[(δ − 1)p3R3 + δτ2p2p3R23 + δτ3p23R33]dτ3
where δ = −E3 as mentioned before, is the marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for the public
good. It should be noted that δ is not an exogenous parameter of our model as E3 depends
on both g and u both of which are endogenous.
It is well known that if a government’s ability to raise revenue by lump-sum taxation
is limited, the government must finance the public good, at the margin, by distorting taxes.
Under such circumstances, δ > 1 at the optimum. We assume this to be the case. We shall
consider many possible values of this parameter within a reasonable range. A reasonable
range for the equilibrium value of δ can be found by looking at the empirical literature on
the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) which an optimizing government should equate to
the MWP. Estimates for MCPF vary widely. Fullerton (1991) produced estimates between
1 and 1.25 for the US; Ballard et al (1985) suggest a range of 1.15 to 1.50. For Pakistan,
Ahmad and Stern (1991) estimated the range of MCPF to be 1.15 – 2.01. Although there is
no consensus on the matter, it seems reasonable to view values below 1.25 as fairly normal,
and values above 1.5 as uncommonly high (see Keen and Lahiri (1998)).
Defining the following elasticities
η2 = − ∂E2
∂{p2(1 + t)(1 + τ2)} ·
p2(1 + t)(1 + τ2)
E2
= −E22
E2
· p2(1 + t)(1 + τ2),
²22 = −
∂(E2 −R2)
∂{p2(1 + τ2)} ·
p2(1 + τ2)
E2 −R2 = −
(1 + t)E22 −R22
E2 −R2 · p2(1 + τ2),
²32 =
∂(−R3)
∂{p2(1 + τ2)} ·
p2(1 + τ2)
−R3 =
R32
R3
· p2(1 + τ2),
15For the following quasi-linear direct utility function this approximation will hold:
u(c1, c2, g) = v(c2) + λ1c1 + f(g),
where ci is the consumption of good i (i = 1, 2), and λ1 is a given constant.
16We assume that the coefficient of du in the equation below is positive. This assumption is similar to the
well-known ‘Hatta condition’.
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²33 = −
∂(−R3)
∂{p3(1 + τ3)} ·
p3(1 + τ3)
−R3 = −
R33
R3
· p3(1 + τ3),
²23 =
∂(E2 −R2)
∂{p3(1 + τ3)} ·
p3(1 + τ3)
E2 −R2 = −
R32
E2 −R2 · p3(1 + τ3),
equation (4) can be rewritten as
[E4 − {δτ2 + (γ + δ(1− γ))t(1 + τ2)}p2E24] du
= p2(1 + τ2)E2
[
(1− γ)(δ − 1)− {δτ2 + t(1 + τ2)(γ + δ(1− γ))}η2
(1 + t)(1 + τ2)
]
dt
−p3R3
[
δ − 1 + δτ2²
3
2
1 + τ2
− δτ3²
3
3
1 + τ3
]
dτ3 (5)
+δp2(E2 −R2)
[{δ + (γ + δ(1− γ))t− (1 + t)}E2 − (δ − 1)R2)
δ(E2 −R2) −
τ2²
2
2
1 + τ2
−γ + δ(1− γ)
δ
· tE2η2
E2 −R2 +
τ3²
2
3
1 + τ3
]
dτ2
Having obtained a general welfare equation, we shall now consider welfare implications
of piecemeal policy reforms and derive optimal levels of second-best taxes.
3.1 Revenue-Neutral Reforms
In this subsection, we assume that large changes in the tax rates are not possible and the
government can only carry out piece-meal reforms. Furthermore, given the importance of
government revenue, we shall also assume that any reform will need to keep tax revenue
unchanged at the initial equilibrium, We shall subdivide this exercise into two part. In the
first, we shall assume that tariffs on final goods (τ2) is unalterable and the government can
only change consumption tax (t) and tariffs on intermediate inputs (τ3). In the second, τ3 is
assumed to be unalterable. These two exercises are taken up below in turn.
3.1.1 Reform of t and τ3:
We now consider a piecemeal reform of t and τ3 such that government revenue (evaluated at
the initial equilibrium values) does not change, i.e.
(1− γ)(1 + τ2)p2E2dt = p3R3dτ3 (6)
Substituting (6) into (5), we obtain
[E4 − {δτ2 + (γ + δ(1− γ))t(1 + τ2)}p2E24] du
dτ3
= −δp3R3
[{δτ2 + (γ + δ(1− γ))t(1 + τ2)}η2
δ(1 + t)(1 + τ2)(1− γ) +
τ2²
3
2
1 + τ2
− τ3²
3
3
1 + τ3
]
. (7)
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A number of comments are in order. First, if the right hand side of (7) is negative, we
can make a case for reducing tariffs on intermediate input imports and raising consumption
tax. Second, since −R3 > 0, when γ = 0 the sign of du/dτ3 does not depend on the level of
δ, but the magnitude of it is proportional to δ. Finally, a higher initial value of t, τ2, η2 or
²32 makes it more likely that du/dτ3 > 0, and a higher value of either τ3 or ²
3
3 makes it more
likely that du/dτ3 < 0. Later on we shall see if the above expression for du/dτ3 is positive
or negative for the economy of Pakistan.
3.1.2 Reform of t and τ2
In contrast to the analysis of the previous subsection, here we assume that tariffs on the
intermediate inputs is unalterable, and consumption tax t and tariffs on good 2 τ2 are subject
to reforms. In particular, we consider a piecemeal reform of t and τ2 such that government
revenue (evaluated at the initial equilibrium values) does not change, i.e.
(1− γ)(1 + τ2)p2E2dt = −p2(E2 −R2)dτ2 (8)
Substituting (8) into (5), we obtain
[E4 − {δτ2 + (γ + δ(1− γ))t(1 + τ2)}p2E24] du
dτ2
= δp2(E2 −R2)
[
− τ2²
2
2
1 + τ2
+
τ3²
2
3
1 + τ3
− {γ + δ(1− γ)}tη2
δ(1− θ) −
δ − 1
δ
+
{δ + (γ + δ(1− γ))t− (1 + t)} − (δ − 1)θ
δ(1− θ) +
{δτ2 + t(1 + τ2)(γ + δ(1− γ))}η2
(1 + t)(1 + τ2)(1− γ)δ
]
,(9)
where θ = R2/E2 is the share of domestic production of good 2 in the domestic market.
Once again, if the above expression is negative, we can make a case for reducing tariffs
on manufacturing imports and raising consumption tax. In contrast to the earlier piecemeal
reform, here the sign of du/dτ2 does depend on the size of δ even when γ = 0. It is also to
be noted that whereas a higher τ3 or ²
2
3 is more likely to make du/dτ2 positive, a higher ²
2
2 is
more likely to do the opposite. We shall come back to this exercise once we have presented
the parameter estimates for Pakistan.
3.2 Optimal taxes
In this subsection we do not allow any of the tax instruments to be unalterable, and the only
distortion in the economy is the government revenue constraint.
The optimal levels of t, τ2 and τ3 are obtained as{
²22 −
²32²
2
3
²33
− η2
1− θ
}
τ˜2
1 + τ˜2
=
δ − 1
δ
(
²33
(
1− 1− γ
1− θ
)
+ ²23
)
, (10)
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τ˜3
1 + τ˜3
=
τ˜2²
3
2
(1 + τ˜2)²33
+
(δ − 1)
δ²33
, (11)
t˜ = − δη2τ˜2
(1 + τ˜2)ξ
+
(1− γ)(δ − 1)
ξ
, (12)
where θ = R2/E2, as stated before, is the share of domestic production of good 2 in the
domestic market,17 and ξ = η2(γ + δ(1− γ))− (1− γ)(δ − 1).
The optimal value of the consumption tax rate t has two components as can be seen
from (12). The second term on the right hand side of (12) is due to the revenue-raising
objective of the government and this is equal to zero when δ = 1.18 The first term corrects
distortion introduced on the consumption side by a non-zero value of τ2: if τ˜2 is positive
(negative), this component is negative (positive). When δ ' 1, the optimal values of t and
τ2 are of the opposite sign. The optimal value of τ3 also has two components. The second
term on the right hand side of (11) is present once again due to the revenue-raising motive
of the government. The first term term this time has the same sign as τ˜2. This is because τ3
which is tariff on intermediate inputs, cannot correct distortions on the consumption side,
and instead does so on the production side. A higher value of τ2 moves resources into the
production of good 2 by raising the producers’ price of this good. A higher value of τ3
then corrects this distortion by raising the productions costs in sector 2. It can be easily
verified that when δ = 1, all the optimal values are zeroes, as one would expect. Once we
have presented the parameter estimates for Pakistan, we shall return to these expressions
for optimal taxes.
4 An application to Pakistan
In sections 2 and 3 we developed and analyzed a theoretical model which is based on stylised
facts related to the economy of Pakistan. The purpose of the present section is to quantify,
for the case of Pakistan, the optimal second-best levels of the three policy instruments,
the formulae of which have been obtained in subsection 3.2 (see (10)-(12)). We shall also
derive empirically the signs of piecemeal policy reform exercises conducted in subsections
3.1.1 and 3.1.2 (see (7) and (9)). In order to be able to do so, we shall need to estimate a
number of elasticities, viz. elasticity of import demand of intermediate inputs with respect
to own price, ²33, and with respect to the domestic price of the importables, ²
3
2; elasticity of
import demand of good 2 (importables) with respect to own price, ²22, and with respect to
the domestic price of intermediate inputs, ²23; and the own price elasticity of consumption
demand for the importables, η2.
19
As for η2, we shall rely on estimates obtained by Ahmed, Ludlow and Stern (1988).
17It can be easily shown that θ = (η2− ²22)/(φ2− ²22), where φ2 is the price elasticity of output for good 2.
18For reasonable values of the parameters ξ is expected to be positive.
19See table 2 for the precise definitions of importables and intermediate inputs.
8
They computed uncompensated price elasticity of demand for several category of goods
from a modified Linear Expenditure System using a household-level data for 1976. For
goods which could be regarded as importables the estimated elasticities are 0.65 (tea), 0.75
(edible oils) and 1.08 (other non-food). In the light of these estimates we take η2 as 0.90 to
be a reasonable approximation for the own price elasticity of consumption demand for the
importables. As for the other elasticities, we shall estimate them using regression analysis
to annual time series data for the period 1975-2000.20 In particular, we shall estimate the
following two equations:
lnY = α1 + α2 ln(p2(1 + τ2))/p1)(−1) + α3 ln(p3(1 + τ3))/p1)
+ α4 ln(W/p1) + α5 lnX + α6 lnY(−1). (13)
lnZ = β1 + β2 ln(p2(1 + τ2))/p1) + β3 ln(p3(1 + τ3))/p1)(−1)
+ β4 ln(W/p1) + β5 lnX, (14)
where Y and Z are the imports of respectively intermediate inputs and good 2; W is unit
cost of labour; X is real gross domestic products (GDP); and the subscript (−1) denotes a
lag of one period.21
It is well known that time series data can exhibit non-stationarity and that regression
estimates based on such data can be unreliable. However, with only 26 years of data,
the scope for elaborate time series modelling is fairly limited. We have, in this paper,
restricted ourselves to estimation of regression equations with variables expressed in levels.
The estimation techniques are ordinary least squares (OLS), instrumental variables (IV)
and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). The choice of IV is dictated by the consideration
that one of the explanatory variables, namely X, is likely to be endogenous. The regression
results are given in tables 3, 4 and 5.
The regression results perform well in terms of all the diagnostic tests. For equation
(14), the D-W value suggests that the error term is autocorrelated, and these have been
corrected by using AR(1) and/or AR(2) terms (see table 4).
The own-price elasticities — which are the coefficients of the price variables in the
regression equation — are expected to be negative and they are. These are also statistically
significant. The cross-price elasticities (lagged by one period) are also always of the right
(positive) sign and are significant. The coefficients of W/p1 and X are, as expected, positive
(with one exception), though the coefficients for the former are not significant in (14). It
is also to be noted that the lagged endogenous variable in (13) is significant in the second
OLS estimation in table 3. It becomes insignificant when the equation is estimated using IV
method which also makes the coefficient for cross-price elasticity insignificant. Considering
everything, we believe that the best estimate for the import demand of consumables is
provided by the second equation in table 4, and the best regression estimate of the import
demand of intermediate inputs is given by the second equation of table 3. However, there
20There is a significant empirical literature on the estimation of demand elasticities in international trade
(see, for example, Goldstein and Khan (1985) and Panagariya et al (2001)). However, the bulk of the
literature deals with the estimation of the demand elasticities of exports.
21See table 2 for details.
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is potential for obtaining more efficient estimates as the error terms in the two equations
may be contemporaneously correlated. Allowing for this possibility, we estimate our chosen
equations using SUR method. The estimates are given in table 5. Of the two sets presented
there, we choose the second set for computing elasticities.
We shall now use these estimates to compute the optimal values of the instruments
under various scenarios, and the effects of the two piecemeal policy reform exercises. It is to
be noted that our chosen regression for demand for intermediate inputs has lagged endoge-
nous variables and, therefore, to compute long-run values of the elasticities, the estimated
coefficients need to be divided by the factor 1 minus the coefficient of the lagged endogenous
variable. Therefore, for the chosen equations we have ²33 = 1.2732, ²
3
2 = 0.48, ²
2
3 = 0.2411,
and ²22 = 0.5707, and as mentioned before, following Ahmed, Ludlow and Stern (1988) we
consider η2 = 0.90. Furthermore, other parameters, required to carry out the piecemeal
reform exercises, are taken to be their current actual values.22 We also compute that γ = 0.2
and θ = 0.45. However, around these chosen values we carry out limited sensitivity analysis.
The optimal values of the three instruments are given in tables 6-9 for different values
for the parameter δ (MCPF). The four tables differ in that sensitivity analysis is carried out
with respect to θ, γ, η2 and ²
3
3 respectively in tables 6 7, 8, and 9.
First consider table 6, which gives optimal values for tariff/tax instruments when gov-
ernment uses these instruments to raise revenues to provide a public good. Table 6 provides
the optimal values of these instruments when η2 = 0.9 and γ = 0.2. To recall, these param-
eters are respectively the own price elasticity of consumption demand for the importables,
and the fraction of consumption tax revenue that is not collected by the government. Given
these values of η2 and γ we consider optimal values of tariff/tax instruments by allowing
θ (share of domestic production of good 2 in the domestic market) to take four different
values: 0.4, 0.45, 0.5 and 0.55. With each of these values, table 6 provides optimal values
of tariff/tax instruments for a range of values of the parameter δ (MCPF). The following
pattern emerges: (i) all optimal taxes increase as δ increases, (ii) irrespective of the choice
22The current values for tariff on final goods (τ2), tariff and on intermediate inputs (τ3) are based on
values reported in three different sources. A Government of Pakistan publication (Government of Pakistan
(2002)) reports import duty on (i) ‘consumer goods’ at 16%, on (2) ‘raw materials for consumer goods’ at
16%, on (3) ‘capital goods’ at 20% and on (4) ‘raw materials on capital goods’ at 20% in 2000-2001. These
figures are based on imports and duty collection at Karachi customs. The respective shares of the imports
in these categories are 16%, 60%, 16% and 8%. The WTO secretariats Trade Policy Review of Pakistan
(WTO (2001)) reports an average tariff of 20.4% in 2001-2002. It does not provide separate estimates for
tariff on final goods and tariffs on intermediate inputs/raw materials. An ongoing World Bank Study (The
World Bank (2003)) estimates the average unweighted tariff in 2003 to be 17.3%. These tariffs may have
to be adjusted upwards if the affect of some of the income withholding taxes, which are akin to import
duties, are also factored in. The order of magnitude of these taxes is not easy to estimate but 1-2 percentage
point will not be an unreasonable estimate. With this as a background, our choice of τ2 = 0.185 and of
τ3 = 0.16 is likely to be a reasonable approximation of the current values of these taxes. The current value
of consumption tax t is obtained by noting that the General Sales Tax (which is a value-added tax) is 15%,
to which we added another 4.5% which is approximately the current ratio of excise tax to the General Sales
Tax. The assumption here is that excise tax is uniformly applied to all goods on which the sales tax is
applicable. This assumption is not realistic but one we have applied consistently in calculating the sales tax
inclusive prices of final goods.
10
of δ, optimal trade tariffs increase monotonically with θ, and (iii) irrespective of the choice
of δ, optimal consumption tax decreases monotonically with θ.
The pattern of results (i)-(iii) is intuitively plausible. The first result implies that
as marginal willingness to pay for a public good increases, taxes which allow the provision
of the public good, have to be increased correspondingly. The second result implies that
as the share of domestic production of good 2 in the domestic market increases and that
of imported goods decrease, the optimal tariffs on final goods have to increase because of
the shrinkage of the base of trade taxes.23 The corollary of this result is the third result
which says that as the base of the consumption tax increases, the optimal consumption tax
decreases.
We note that for an intermediate value of δ (1.20-1.25) and of θ (0.45), optimal tariff
on intermediate good is a little higher than the actual value of it (16%), but the optimal
tax on final good is considerably lower than the actual average tax on final goods which is
about 18.5%.
Next consider table 7. This table also provides optimal values of tax/tariff instruments
but differs from table 6 in that γ is not held fixed at 0.2 but allowed to take four different
values (0.00, 0.10. 0.15, and 0.20). On the other hand θ is now held fixed at 0.45, together
with η2 which is held fixed at 0.9 — the same value as in table 6. The simulations suggest
the following pattern: (i) all taxes increase with δ (as in table 6), (ii) optimal trade taxes
decrease monotonically with γ, and (iii) optimal consumption tax increase monotonically
with γ.
Again the results are, as we would expect. The reason why optimal taxes increase
with δ was explained above. Results (ii) and (iii) suggest that as the share of the government
in total sales tax declines, consumption tax is less effective as a means of raising revenue and
thus greater reliance ought to be placed on trade taxes and less on consumption tax.
Turning to table 8, which provides simulation with θ held at 0.45 and γ at 0.2, and
η2 allowed to vary between 0.7 and 1.0, we note the following pattern: (i) all taxes increase
with δ (as in table 6 and 7), (ii) all optimal taxes decrease monotonically with η2. This
is because as consumption elasticity rises, the effect of an increase in either t or τ2 on tax
revenue will be larger. Thus the government can set these two tax rates at a lower level
when η2 rises. For reasons explained above (see the discussion following (12)), the optimal
value of τ3 is positively related to that of τ2.
As in the previous simulations, in table 9, we find that for all four different values
of ²33 — viz., 1.2732 (our estimated value), 1.50, 1.75 and 1.85 — all three optimal taxes
increase with δ. The optimal values of τ3 and t decreases with ²
3
3, but that of τ2 increases
with it. In other words, as the own-price elasticity of intermediate inputs increases, the
government should depend less on tariffs on intermediate inputs and more on tariffs on the
final importables for raising revenue. This is because a small decrease in τ3 has a bigger
positive effect on the level of imports of intermediate inputs (and thus on tax revenue) when
23The increase in tariffs on intermediate inputs is related to the increase in tariffs on final goods (see
discussion following (12)).
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²33 is bigger rather than smaller. The reason why optimal value of t is negatively related to
that of τ2 has been explained above (see the discussion following (12)).
Looking at all the optimal taxes overall, it can be broadly concluded that for interme-
diate values of δ around the range 1.20-1.30, optimal levels of t and τ3 are roughly comparable
to their actual current levels (16% and 19.5% respectively), but the optimal value of τ2 is
considerably lower than its actual level (18.5%). Thus, there is still considerable scope for
further liberalization of tariffs of final goods.
Finally, as far as the revenue-neutral reforms are concerned (see subsections (3.1.1)
and (3.1.2)), we find that in all our simulation runs, the right hand side of (7) is always
positive. This suggests that a further decrease, from the present level, in current tariffs on
intermediate inputs τ3 and an associated increase in consumption tax rate t keeping tax
revenue constant, will be welfare reducing. However, the right hand side of (9) is positive
only for sufficiently high values of δ. In other words, for sufficiently low values of MCPF, a
decrease in current tariffs on final goods τ2 and an associated increase in consumption tax
rate t keeping tax revenue constant, will be welfare increasing, but not so if MCPF is high
enough. The critical value of δ (MCPF) below which the right hand side of (9) is negative
— we shall denote this critical value by δ¯ — depends on some of the parameters such as γ
and θ that we have been changing in our simulation exercises. For the benchmark scenario
— i.e., when θ = 0.45, η2 = 0.9, γ = 0.2, ²
3
3 = 1.2732 — the value of δ¯ is 1.17. Since the
right hand side of (9) does not depend on ²33 at all, this parameter does not affect δ¯ at all.
Furthermore, whereas the third term on the right hand side of (9) decreases with η2, the
last term increases with it. The net effect is that δ¯ is insensitive to changes in η2 as can be
seen from the last row of table 8. However, as can be seen from the last rows of tables 6
and 7, δ¯ is increasing in θ and decreasing in γ. A higher value of θ means a larger share
of domestic firms in the domestic market of importables implying a lower import level and
thus the tax base for tariffs. Thus, as the level of θ increases, τ2 becomes less effective as
an instrument for raising revenue, and the range of δ over which a shift from tariffs on final
goods to consumption tax is welfare improving also increases, i.e., the value of δ¯ goes up.
Similarly, when the collection of consumption tax revenue becomes relatively easier — i.e.,
when the value of γ goes down — consumption tax becomes a more effective method for
raising revenue and the value of δ¯ increases.
5 Conclusion
Although trade policy reform has been on the agenda at international negotiations for a long
time, and many GATT Rounds have gone by, it is only recently that developing countries
in general, and Pakistan in particular, have started bringing down trade barriers. There are
many problems with such reforms. First, trade barriers in the developed world for imports
from the developing countries make it difficult for the governments in the developing countries
to ‘sell’ those reforms at home. Tariffs are easy to collect (relative to consumption tax)
and serves to satisfy domestic political lobbies. Considering serious budgetary difficulties
and lobbying activities in most developing countries, this is an important impediment to
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trade policy reform.24 Lobby groups however have disparate interests. For example, in
Pakistan, concern for large scale lay off of workers in Pakistan Steel Mills, was an important
impediment in lowering the very high import tariffs on steel, an intermediate input into
the manufacturing industry. On the other hand business groups with investments in import
substituting industries, which use intermediate inputs, have a strong interest in lower tariffs
on intermediate inputs and higher tariffs on consumables. It is, therefore, instructive to
examine the structure of various taxes when the ability of the government to change taxes,
is limited, i.e. some taxes are unalterable under pressure from interest groups, and when
the government faces serious revenue constraint.
There is another type of reform that many international institutions are pushing the
developing countries to adopt. Developing countries are being persuaded to move away from
distortionary tariffs to non-distortionary value added taxes on consumption, in order to raise
tax revenue, i.e. the developing countries are under pressure to introduce revenue-neutral
tax reforms.
In this paper, we have developed a stylised theoretical model for the economy of
Pakistan and then based on the model we have estimated optimal values of second-best
taxes as well as analyzed the efficacy of revenue-neutral piecemeal tax reforms. The second
part of our analysis, viz. the estimation part, has a number of limitations. The most
important one arises due to the fact that the time series data is only available for 26 years
and this limits the applicability of some of the modern time series econometrics techniques
to the data. However, we are able to draw certain conclusions which are rather suggestive.
The first set of conclusions is drawn from the revenue-neutral reform exercise. Two types of
revenue neutral reforms were considered. In the first, the tariff on final good was considered
unalterable at its present level but the tariff on intermediate good and the consumption
tax were alterable. Our estimates suggest that reducing tariff on intermediate goods and
increasing consumption tax would not be welfare improving. This is an important conclusion
considering that lowering of tariff on intermediate inputs is regarded in many quarters as
essential if domestic products are to compete on equal footing with imports.
In the second revenue-neutral reform exercise, the tariff on intermediate good was
unalterable at its present level and the tariff on final good and the consumption tax were
alterable. Our conclusion here is that the welfare affect of lowering of tariff on final good
and raising consumption tax from their present levels depends on the marginal willingness
to pay for the public good (MWP). For relatively low values of MWP, lowering of tariffs
and the corresponding increase in consumption tax to maintain revenue unchanged, would
be welfare improving but this substitution would not be welfare improving for high values
of MWP. The MWP is sometimes estimated by equating it with the marginal cost of public
funds. For Pakistan the estimated range of MCPF is quite wide and this does not allow us
to state in a clear-cut fashion whether the substitution would be welfare improving or not.
However, a somewhat more clear-cut conclusion that does follow from our analysis is that
if a piecemeal reform of taxes in the form of moving away from tariffs to consumption is
being considered, then it is important to distinguish between different types of tariffs. In
24See Rodrik (1992) for a fuller discussion on the limits to trade policy reforms.
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particular, if at all, it is the tariff on final goods, and not that on intermediate inputs, that
should be substituted by consumption tax.
The second set of conclusions emerge from the optimal tax and tariff calculations.
The optimal tariff calculations are reported for a set of benchmark parameter values and
for a range around these benchmark values. These exercises suggest that if the marginal
willingness to pay for the public good is neither too high nor too low, then: (1) the optimal
values of tariffs on intermediate goods and consumption tax are comparable with the actual
values of these taxes (16 percent and 19.5 percent respectively), and (2) the optimal tariff
on final good is considerably lower than the actual value of 18.5 percent. These estimates
suggest that further lowering of tariff on intermediate goods may not be the best course to
follow but there is considerable scope for reducing tariff on final goods.
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Table 1: Definitions of Variables in the Theoretical Model
Good Definition
Good 1 Numeraire good
Good 2 Importable final good
Good 3 Intermediate good
g Level of public good provision
u Utility level of the representative consumer
p1 International price of good 1
p2 International price of good 2
p3 International price of good 3
τ2 Ad-valorem import tariff on good 2
τ3 Ad-valorem import tariff on good 3
t Ad-valorem value added tax on good 2
T Tax revenue
²22 Own price elasticity of import demand for good 2 (final good)
²23 Elasticity of import demand of good 2 (final good) with respect
to the price of good 3 (intermediate good)
²32 Elasticity of import demand of good 3 (intermediate good) with
respect to the price of good 2 (final good)
²33 Own price elasticity for import demand of good 3 (intermediate good)
δ Marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for the public good which is
equal to marginal cost of public funds
The critical value of δ below which the right hand side
δ¯ of (9) is negative.
η2 Own price elasticity of demand of good 2 (final good)
γ Fraction of consumption tax revenue that the government is unable to collect
θ Share of domestic production of good 2 (final good) in the domestic market
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Table 3: Import demand for Intermediate inputs
No of observations: 26 (1975-2000)
Dependent variable: 1 (OLS) 2 (OLS) 3 (IV)
ln Y
C 0.3018 -0.1745 -0.1495
(0.41, 0.69) (0.23, 0.82) (0.19, 0.85)
ln (p2(1 + τ2)/p1)(−1) 0.2526 0.4069 0.3083
(1.14, 0.27) (1.8068, 0.08) (1.28, 0.22)
ln p3(1 + τ3)/p1 -1.1830 -0.9341 -1.1294
(6.64, 0.00) (4.32, 0.00) (4.67, 0.00)
ln W/p1 0.7128 0.5836 0.9110
(2.15, 0.04) (1.81, 0.08) (2.07, 0.05)
ln X 1.3915 0.9904 1.3370
(17.53, 0.00) (4.30, 0.00) (4.73, 0.00)
Ln Y(−1) 0.3119 0.0711
(1.8417, 0.08) (0.35, 0.73)
R2 0.9593 0.9652 0.9613
DW 1.7407 2.2005 1.8895
Log likelihood 19.1963 21.2328
F-statistic 123.7753 110.9766 100.8636
Note:
1. The first figure within the parenthesis is the value for the t-statistic and the second gives
the probability of not rejecting the null hypothesis βi = 0.
2. The subscript (−1) to the variables denotes backward lags in those variables.
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Table 4: Import demand for consumer goods
No of observations: 26 (1975-2000)
Dependent variable: 1 (OLS) 2(OLS) 3 (OLS) 4(IV)
ln Z
C 3.2845 3.3514 3.2880 3.1383
(3.26, 0.00) (3.71, 0.00) (3.74, 0.00) (3.57, 0.00)
ln p2(1 + τ2)/p1 -0.4128 -0.6953 -0.7240 -0.7090
(1.61, 0.12) (2.31,0.03) (2.61, 0.02) (2.54, 0.02)
ln (p3(1 + τ3)/p1)(−1) 0.1538 0.3552 0.3260 0.3169
(0.94, 0.35) (2,13, 0.05) (2.01, 0.06) (1.95, 0.07)
ln W/p1 -0.0611 0.0343 0.1275 0.1435
(0.19, 0.85) (0.10, 0.92) (0.41, 0.68) (0.46, 0.65)
ln X 1.0417 1.0423 1.0552 1.0655
(10.00, 0.00) (11.17, 0.00) (11.94, 0.00) (11.89, 0.00)
AR(1) 0.1449
(0.59, 0.56)
AR(2) -0.4423 -0.4374 -0.4339
(1.94, 0.07) (1.97, 0.06) (1.95, 0.07)
R2 0.9095 0.9057 0.9040 0.9040
DW 1.6412 1.9812 1.7562 1.7749
Log likelihood 17.0667 17.0358 16.8277
F-statistic 52.7617 27.2074 33.9133 33.9923
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Table 5: SUR Estimates
No of observations: 26 (1975-2000)
Estimation # 1 1a 2 2a
Dependent variable: ln Y ln Z ln Y ln Z
C -0.1255 2.8030 -0.1425 2.9301
(-0.19, 0.84) (3.69, 0.00) (0.22, 0.82) (3.76. 0.00)
ln p2(1 + τ2)/p1 -0.5767 -0.5707
(2.38, 0.02) (2.28, 0.03)
ln (p2(1 + τ2)/p1)(−1) 0.3446 0.3565
(1.81, 0.08) (1.86, 0.07)
ln p3(1 + τ3)/p1 -0.9440 -0.9358
(5.18, 0.00) (5.08, 0.00)
ln (p3(1 + τ3)/p1)(−1) 0.2107 0.2411
(1.51, 0.13) (1.68, 0.10)
ln W/p1 0.6045 0.2199 0.5930 0.1434
(2.21, 0.03) (0.81, 0.42) (2.16, 0.04) (0.49, 0.63)
ln X 1.0589 1.0967 1.0560 1.0830
(5.50, 0.00) (14.12, 0.00) (5.38, 0.00) (13.45, 0.00)
ln Y(−1) 0.2550 0.2650
(1.79, 0.08) (1.84, 0.07)
AR(1) 0.1138
(0.53, 0.60)
AR(2) -0.3788 0.3848
(1.91, 0.06) ((1.94, 0.06)
R2 0.9649 0.9013 0.9649 0.9030
DW 2.1878 1.8634 2.1897 2.0132
S.E. 0.1225 0.1405 0.1224 0.1433
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Table 6: Optimal taxes (in percent)
δ↓ τ˜2 τ˜3 t˜
θ→ 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.05 0.9 1.4 1.9 2.4 4.2 4.5 4.7 4.9 3.6 3.0 2.5 2.0
1.10 1.7 2.7 3.7 4.7 8.4 8.9 9.3 9.7 7.2 6.0 5.0 4.0
1.15 2.4 4.0 5.4 6.9 12.5 13.2 13.9 14.5 10.8 9.1 7.5 6.0
1.20 3.1 5.1 7.1 8.9 16.6 17.6 18.5 19.4 14.4 12.2 10.0 8.1
1.25 3.7 6.2 8.6 10.9 20.6 21.8 23.0 24.2 18.1 15.3 12.6 10.1
1.30 4.3 7.2 10.1 12.8 24.5 26.1 27.6 29.0 21.9 18.4 15.2 12.2
1.35 4.9 8.2 11.4 14.6 28.4 30.3 32.0 33.7 25.6 21.6 17.8 14.3
1.40 5.4 9.1 12.7 16.4 32.3 34.4 36.5 38.5 29.4 24.8 20.5 16.4
1.45 5.9 10.0 14.0 18.0 36.0 38.5 41.0 43.3 33.3 28.0 23.1 18.6
1.50 6.4 10.8 15.2 19.6 39.8 42.6 45.4 48.0 37.1 31.2 25.8 20.7
1.55 6.8 11.5 16.3 21.2 43.5 46.7 49.7 52.7 41.0 34.5 28.5 22.9
1.60 7.2 12.3 17.4 22.7 47.1 50.6 54.1 57.5 45.0 37.9 31.3 25.1
1.65 7.6 13.0 18.5 24.1 50.7 54.6 58.4 62.2 48.9 41.2 34.0 27.3
1.70 8.0 13.7 19.5 25.4 54.2 58.5 62.7 66.9 53.0 44.6 36.8 29.6
1.75 8.3 14.3 20.4 26.8 57.7 62.4 67.0 71.5 57.0 48.0 39.6 31.9
δ¯ 1.07 1.17 1.29 1.43
Note: η2 = 0.9, γ = 0.2, ²
3
3 = 1.2732
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Table 7: Optimal taxes (in percent)
δ↓ τ˜2 τ˜3 t˜
γ→ 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.20
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.05 3.4 2.4 1.9 1.4 5.3 4.9 4.7 4.5 2.1 2.6 2.8 3.0
1.10 6.7 4.7 3.7 2.7 10.5 9.7 9.3 8.9 4.2 5.1 5.6 6.0
1.15 9.9 6.9 5.4 4.0 15.8 14.5 13.9 13.2 6.4 7.7 8.4 9.1
1.20 13.0 8.9 7.0 5.1 21.2 19.3 18.5 17.6 8.6 10.4 11.3 12.2
1.25 16.1 10.9 8.5 6.2 26.5 24.2 23.0 21.8 10.8 13.0 14.2 15.3
1.30 19.0 12.8 9.9 7.2 31.9 28.9 27.5 26.1 13.0 15.7 17.1 18.4
1.35 21.9 14.6 11.3 8.2 37.4 33.7 32.0 30.3 15.3 18.4 20.0 21.6
1.40 24.6 16.3 12.6 9.1 42.8 38.5 36.4 34.4 17.6 21.2 23.0 24.8
1.45 27.3 18.0 13.8 10.0 48.3 43.2 40.9 38.5 19.9 24.0 26.0 28.0
1.50 30.0 19.6 15.0 10.8 53.8 48.0 45.3 42.6 22.2 26.8 29.0 31.2
1.55 32.5 21.1 16.1 11.5 59.3 52.7 49.6 46.7 24.6 29.6 32.1 34.5
1.60 35.0 22.6 17.2 12.3 64.8 57.4 54.0 50.6 27.0 32.4 35.2 37.9
1.65 37.5 24.0 18.2 13.0 70.4 62.1 58.3 54.6 29.4 35.3 38.3 41.2
1.70 39.8 25.4 19.2 13.7 76.0 66.8 62.6 58.5 31.8 38.3 41.4 44.6
1.75 42.1 26.7 20.2 14.3 81.7 71.5 66.8 62.4 34.3 41.2 44.6 48.0
δ¯ 1.46 1.32 1.25 1.17
Note: η2 = 0.9, θ = 0.45, ²
3
3 = 1.2732
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Table 8: Optimal taxes (in percent)
δ↓ τ˜2 τ˜3 t˜
η2→ 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.05 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.2 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.4 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7
1.10 4.0 3.2 2.7 2.3 9.4 9.1 8.9 8.7 7.4 6.7 6.0 5.5
1.15 5.9 4.7 4.0 3.4 14.1 13.6 13.2 13.0 11.3 10.1 9.1 8.2
1.20 7.6 6.1 5.1 4.4 18.8 18.0 17.6 17.2 15.4 13.6 12.2 11.0
1.25 9.3 7.4 6.2 5.3 23.4 22.5 21.8 21.4 19.6 17.2 15.3 13.7
1.30 10.9 8.7 7.2 6.2 28.0 26.9 26.1 25.5 24.0 20.9 18.4 16.4
1.35 12.4 9.9 8.2 7.0 32.6 31.2 30.3 29.6 28.5 24.6 21.6 19.2
1.40 13.8 11.0 9.1 7.8 37.1 35.5 34.4 33.7 33.3 28.4 24.8 21.9
1.45 15.2 12.0 10.0 8.5 41.6 39.8 38.5 37.7 38.2 32.3 28.0 24.7
1.50 16.5 13.0 10.8 9.2 46.2 44.0 42.6 41.6 43.3 36.3 31.2 27.4
1.55 17.8 14.0 11.5 9.8 50.6 48.3 46.7 45.5 48.6 40.4 34.5 30.1
1.60 19.0 14.9 12.3 10.4 55.1 52.4 50.6 49.4 54.2 44.6 37.9 32.9
1.65 20.1 15.8 13.0 11.0 59.5 56.6 54.6 53.2 60.0 48.9 41.2 35.6
1.70 21.2 16.6 13.7 11.6 64.0 60.7 58.5 57.0 66.1 53.2 44.6 38.4
1.75 22.3 17.4 14.3 12.1 68.4 64.8 62.4 60.7 72.4 57.7 48.0 41.1
δ¯ 1.19 1.18 1.17 1.16
Note: θ = 0.45, γ = 0.2, ²33 = 1.2732
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Table 9: Optimal taxes (in percent)
δ↓ τ˜2 τ˜3 t˜
²33→ 1.2732 1.50 1.75 1.85 1.2732 1.50 1.75 1.85 1.2732 1.50 1.75 1.85
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.05 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.6 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.3 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.8
1.10 2.7 3.6 4.7 5.1 8.9 7.8 6.9 6.6 6.0 5.1 4.0 3.6
1.15 4.0 5.3 6.8 7.4 13.2 11.5 10.2 9.7 9.1 7.7 6.1 5.4
1.20 5.1 6.9 8.9 9.7 17.6 15.2 13.4 12.8 12.2 10.3 8.1 7.3
1.25 6.2 8.4 10.9 11.9 21.8 18.8 16.5 15.7 15.3 12.9 10.2 9.1
1.30 7.2 9.8 12.7 14.0 26.1 22.3 19.5 18.6 18.4 15.5 12.3 11.0
1.35 8.2 11.1 14.5 16.0 30.3 25.8 22.4 21.4 21.6 18.2 14.4 12.9
1.40 9.1 12.4 16.3 17.9 34.4 29.2 25.3 24.1 24.8 20.9 16.6 14.8
1.45 10.0 13.6 17.9 19.7 38.5 32.5 28.1 26.7 28.0 23.6 18.7 16.8
1.50 10.8 14.7 19.5 21.5 42.6 35.8 30.8 29.3 31.2 26.3 20.9 18.7
1.55 11.5 15.8 21.0 23.2 46.7 39.0 33.5 31.8 34.5 29.1 23.1 20.7
1.60 12.3 16.9 22.5 24.9 50.6 42.2 36.1 34.2 37.9 31.9 25.3 22.7
1.65 13.0 17.9 23.9 26.5 54.6 45.3 38.6 36.6 41.2 34.7 27.6 24.7
1.70 13.7 18.9 25.2 28.0 58.5 48.3 41.1 38.9 44.6 37.6 29.8 26.7
1.75 14.3 19.8 26.5 29.5 62.4 51.3 43.5 41.1 48.0 40.5 32.1 28.7
Note: θ = 0.45, γ = 0.2, η2 = 0.9
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